The Tank Attack That Failed

Publisher Marketing: It was essentially 'C' Squadron Poona Horse which faced 'A' Squadron 13 Lancers and 'B' Squadron Poona Horse which faced 'B' and 'C' Squadrons of 13 Lancers. Once 13 Lancers brought in its two remaining squadrons the Indians reinforced Jarpal with half squadron of its 'A' Squadron which was in reserve in Siraj Chak area. Once 31 Cavalry attacked the Indians brought the remaining tanks of 'A' Squadron in Jarpal area. By 1200 hours 13 Lancers which was praised by the Indians for its tremendous valour, keeping aside all the foolhardiness of their modus operandi,31 was written off from the order of battle of the 8 Armoured Brigade! The issue now was no longer containment since the Indians were also considerably shaken, having suffered a large number of tank and infantry casualties in the process. Such was the elan and dash of this attack that the Indian armoured corps historian admitted that 'the only occasion that a breakthrough could have occurred was when two squadrons of 13 Lancers (following Major Nasir's exhortation described in the previous sentence) attacked together in the afternoon, but a gallant last-ditch stand by three tanks of the Poona Horse averted the danger' . Brigadier Khwaja Mohammad Nasir is another example of defective Pakistani promotion system . He was phenomenally brave at Bara Pind but was not promoted beyond brigadier due to petty intelligence reports of Pakistans miserable intelligence agencies which failed repeatedly in war time intelligence gathering. On the other hand many armour officers who reached two and three and four star ranks like Contributor Bio:  Amin, Agha Humayun About the Author About the Author Agha H. Amin, Retired Tank corps major who served in five tank regiments and commanded an independent tank squadron and served in various staff, instructional and research assignments. Presently heads think tank Centre for Study of Intelligence Operations. Editor in Chief of monthly Intelligence Review and monthly Military and Security Review. In his Pakistan Army tenure he wrote three original tactical papers on Reconnaissance Troops Tactical handling, Reconnaissance support group, and RFS Concept. His writings were published in Pakistan Armys prime journals, Pakistan Army Journal and Citadel Journal of Command and Staff College Quetta. His recommendations regarding bifurcation of officer corps into command and staff cadre advanced in 1998 were later accepted. In addition his recommendation of grouping various corps into army commands advanced in an article published in Citadel Journal in 1998 were accepted in 2005 or so. Wrote Pakistan Armys first tactical paper on Tactical handling of Reconnaissance Troop in 1986 which is now being incorporated in Pakistan Armys most important general staff publication " The Armored Regiment in Battle." Wrote The Essential Clausewitz in 1993, Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-59 in 1998, Pakistan Army till 1965 in 1999, Development of Taliban Factions in Afghanistan and Pakistan (2010), Taliban War in Afghanistan (2009). Served as Assistant Editor of Defence Journal, Executive Editor of globe and Founder Editor of Journal of Afghanistan Studies . An associate of the think tanks ORBAT and Alexandrian Defense group. Expert in social impact and environmental assessment carried out various LARP surveys for Asian Bank and World Bank projects. He has lectured at various think tanks and organisations worldwide and shares his knowledge without any honorarium and at zero financial benefits. Carried out various oil and gas and power transmission line surveys in West Asia. One time Assistant Editor Defence Journal, Executive Editor Globe, Editor Journal of Afghanistan Studies Feedback is welcome at e mail address L19aircraft@gmail.com